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Street Prostitution Zones and Crime
By Paul Bisschop, Stephen Kastoryano and Bas van der Klaauw∗
This paper studies the effects of legal street prostitution zones on
registered and perceived crime. We exploit a unique setting in the
Netherlands where these tippelzones were opened in nine cities
under different regulation systems. Our difference-in-differences
analysis of 25 Dutch cities between 1994-2011 shows that opening
a tippelzone decreases registered sexual abuse and rape by about
30 − 40 percent in the first two years. For cities which enforced
licensing in tippelzones, we also find reductions in drug-related
crime and long-term effects on sexual assaults. Effects on perceived
drug nuisance depend on the regulation system and the proximity
of respondents to the tippelzone.
JEL: J16, J47, K14, K23, K42
The Netherlands holds a long tradition of regulated tolerance towards prostitu-
tion. Besides the well-known window prostitution in red-light districts, the Dutch
government also regulates other parts of the sex industry. Prostitution is known
to be related to international trafficking organizations and various other forms
of crime. For instance, the drug use of prostitutes and clients attracts people in
drug trade. The illegal status of sex work also makes prostitutes more vulnera-
ble to sexual violence and abuse (Flight, van Heerwaarden and Lugtmeijer 2003;
Oostven 2008).1 Despite the ongoing debate about legalizing prostitution, there
exists little empirical evidence about the effects of government regulation.2 An
important reason for this is a lack of suitable data.
In this paper, we analyze empirically how the presence of a tippelzone affects the
total amount of various types of crime in Dutch cities. A tippelzone is a designated
legal street prostitution zone where soliciting and purchasing sex is tolerated
between strict opening and closing hours at night.3 The first tippelzone opened in
The Hague in 1983 with eight other cities opening zones during the following three
decades. The first objective of tippelzones was to deal with complaints of residents
∗ Bisschop: SEO Economisch Onderzoek, Roetersstraat 29, 1018 WB Amsterdam, the Netherlands,
(email: p.bisschop@seo.nl). Kastoryano: (corresponding author) Department of Economics, University
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1Around 4.5 million women, of which one million younger than 18 years, are bought and sold world-
wide into forced sexual exploitation in an industry generating profits of about 99 billion annually with
women trafficked to Western Europe producing the highest per person revenue (ILO 2012; ILO 2014).
2See the appendix for an overview of prostitution regulation laws in various countries.
3Tippelzone is derived from the word tippelen, which in Dutch means street walking.
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in the areas frequented by street prostitutes. A second objective was to improve
the health and safety conditions of street prostitutes, who are often heroin and
crack addicts and sometimes illegal immigrants. More recently four tippelzones
closed again, mainly because of the escalation of conflicts between prostitutes.
However, the closings were controversial. The evaluation of tippelzones is relevant
for other countries since street prostitution zones have opened in several cities in
Germany (e.g. Cologne, Dortmund, Essen and Hamburg) and more recently in
Switzerland (Zurich 2013), Italy (Rome 2015) and England (Leeds 2016).
In the empirical analysis we take advantage of the opening and closing of tip-
pelzones to obtain empirical evidence for the relation between regulation of pros-
titution and crime. Since tippelzones did not come as a response to city specific
trends in registered crime, we can exploit the exogenous variation in openings
and closings at different time periods in different cities to obtain causal effects of
regulation of street prostitution on crime. We estimate a difference-in-differences
model using data on registered crime from the Ministry of Justice covering the
period between 1994 and 2011. These data contain several measures of sexual,
drug-related and violent crime in the 25 largest Dutch municipalities. The regis-
tered crime data are not directly linked to prostitutes or tippelzones, but describe
all registered cases of a particular crime category in the municipality. In a second
step we consider the effect of tippelzones on perceived crime obtained from the
Population Police Monitor. This is a large-scale survey containing questions about
feelings of safety and perceived criminal activity in the respondent’s neighborhood
covering the period between 1993 and 2006. We perform several empirical tests
to assess endogenous crime trends around the moment of opening a tippelzone.
Our study is one of the first to provide causal evidence for the connection be-
tween the regulation of prostitution and crime. It relates to a recent paper by
Cunningham and Shah (2014) showing that an unexpected court order in Rhode
Island decriminalizing indoor prostitution decreased rape offenses by 31 percent.
We begin with the premise that the market for sex is connected to criminal
activity, such as sexual violence, drug trade, assault and organized crime. A tip-
pelzone may act as a coordination point for these types of crime. Isolating street
prostitutes within a delimited area attracts individuals prone to sexual violence
and drug dealers which in turn attracts new drug addicts and dealers. However,
police monitoring is higher in tippelzones than in other areas of the city so crimi-
nals of all types - sex traffickers, pimps, drug dealers, violent clients - must trade
off their willingness to operate in the tippelzone with the higher risk of appre-
hension. Indeed, upon the closing of tippelzones, supporters of the zones claimed
that neither street prostitution nor it’s surrounding crime would disappear. Both
would simply spread around the city and become less manageable. The intense
debate between supporters and opponents of tippelzones emphasizes the need to
supplement theoretical models on prostitution and crime spillovers with empirical
evidence.
Another argument in favor of tippelzones is that criminalization of prostitution
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forces the sex industry into the illegal underground market. Lee and Persson
(2013) discuss the connection between legislation of the sex market and the in-
volvement of sex-trafficking organizations. Two alternatives to criminalization
are to fully legalize prostitution or to legalize it but restrict access to a limited
segment of people using licenses. They argue that legalization without licensing
can produce unintended increases in trafficked prostitution. A unique feature of
our analysis is that we can study both systems. Some tippelzones allowed free
entry while others enforced a licensing system immediately or introduced it after
some years. As already discussed above a tippelzone may be a magnet for crime
in particular when there is free entry of prostitutes, but in combination with regu-
lation it may control the market. This motivates our interest in licensing and why
we are interested in crime in the entire city rather than only in the surrounding
of the tippelzone.
Our empirical results show that opening a tippelzone reduces sexual abuse and
rape. These results are mainly driven by a 30−40 percent reduction in the first two
years after opening the tippelzone.4 For tippelzones with a licensing system we
additionally find long-term decreases in sexual assaults and a 25 percent decrease
in drug-related crime which persists in the medium to long-run. We do not find
evidence for effects on other types of crime such as violent assaults and possession
of illegal weapons.
We compare the effects on registered crime with those on perceived crime. Since
policy decisions are influenced by public perception it is relevant to know whether
perceptions on crime are in line with registered crime. Our results indicate that
perceived drug nuisance increases by approximately 6 percentage-points when a
tippelzone is opened. These effects, however, vary depending upon the proximity
to the tippelzone and whether the tippelzone enforced licensing from the start.
For cities where licensing was introduced immediately, we find some indication
that tippelzones achieved their stated goal to reduce the nuisance created by drug-
addicted prostitutes and their followers overall in the city, but at the expense of
residents living close to tippelzones.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we pro-
vide a brief overview of the history of Dutch regulation of prostitution and a
description of tippelzones. Next, we discuss the theoretical literature on the con-
nection between regulation, prostitution and crime, and discuss possible mecha-
nisms through which tippelzones can influence crime. In Section II we present
the difference-in-differences model. Section III describes the data. Section IV
presents the results on registered crime. Section V discusses results on perceived
crime. Section VI concludes.
4These results are very similar to those of Cunningham and Shah (2014).
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I. Background and Literature
A. Dutch Tolerance and Tippelzones
Historically, the Dutch policy towards prostitution has balanced periods of strict
abolition with pragmatic regulated tolerance. In 1911, a law passed criminaliz-
ing anyone running a brothel or organizing prostitution. Shortly thereafter, a
loophole was introduced which gave public prosecutors power to ignore criminal
infringements (Outshoorn 2004). The ban on brothels was, therefore, only en-
forced if other laws were broken. During the second half of the 20th century,
problems surrounding prostitution became more prominent when a new wave of
entrepreneurial criminals became involved in drug trafficking, protection rackets,
human trafficking and money laundering (Brants 1998). In response, the govern-
ment gave power to local authorities to adapt city by-laws. This allowed for areas
where sex shops, window prostitution and brothels were tolerated.
The gradual increase in regulated tolerance initiated a law in 2000 stating that
prostitutes older than 18 years are allowed to work in legal sex houses or brothels
under certain conditions (Daalder 2007). In particular, they must be registered
as workers, pay taxes and maintain regular health checks.5 The new law affected
prostitutes differently across the country since enforcement was again left to local
municipalities. According to Brants (1998), the new law only provided a legal
stamp to policies which already existed in many cities.
The policy change of interest in this paper is the re-localization of street pros-
titutes to designated tolerance areas, the so-called tippelzones. The decision to
open a tippelzone is a cooperative agreement between the mayor, the city council
and the local police department. In the 1980s and 1990s, the first tippelzones
opened to manage problems created by crack and heroin-addicted street prosti-
tutes, their pimps and drug dealers. At that time these problems were prominent
in many cities and fines and arrests were proving ineffective to control the prob-
lems around street prostitutes. Tippelzones were proposed as an innovative way
to reduce nuisance overall in the city by concentrating it in a particular area.
Tippelzones were also intended to address the health and safety needs of prosti-
tutes.6 Mayors and city councils proposing to open a tippelzone in the late 1990s
and early 2000s met less resistance given the positive past experience in other
cities. According to Daalder (2007, p. 38) “the changes in policy regarding the
streetwalking zones are not connected to the lifting of the brothel ban”.7
5The social position of prostitutes is improved by a labor union and their financial consultancy
organization.
6See for instance newspaper and municipality reports for Arnhem: Digibron (1996), Tegenoffensief
Arnhem in drugsproblematiek ; for Heerlen: Tops. P and W. Gooren (2009), Police academy research,
Een pact van het hart ; for Groningen: Digibron (1995), Groningen krijgt na tien jaar tippelzone; for
Utrecht: Gemeente eindrapport (2009), Evaluatie Utrechts Prostitutiebeleid ; for Amsterdam: Trouw
(1995), Amsterdam richt maandag tippelzone Theemsweg in.
7See Flight et al. (2006) for an evaluation of the lifting of the brothel ban.
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Tippelzones are equipped with a variety of features.8 They provide resting
quarters with washing amenities, clean needles and local medical assistance, and
include separate servicing areas where prostitutes remain with clients in a safe
environment (see Figure 1 for a map of the tippelzone in Amsterdam). Permanent
supervisors or semi-permanent task forces are assigned to monitor the tippelzone
and neighboring areas. The task forces are either rotating groups of agents from
the local police district or new hirings for cities with larger tippelzones (11 ad-
ditional officers in Amsterdam). In the early years of tippelzones, an implicit
understanding was that the police did not prioritize arresting illegal workers.
Figure 1. Layout of Amsterdam tippelzone
Source: Van Soomeren (2004).
The first tippelzone appeared in The Hague in 1983 followed by a second group
in the mid-nineties including Rotterdam (1994) and Amsterdam (1996). In total,
nine Dutch cities introduced tippelzones between 1983 and 2004 (see Table 1).
The tippelzones were placed in easily accessible non-residential industrial areas
slightly outside city center.9
After their introduction tippelzones remained controversial. In medium-sized
cities they generally functioned well attracting 20 to 50 prostitutes a night (Oost-
ven 2008). Tippelzones in larger cities often attracted over 100 prostitutes in
8See Van Soomeren (2004) for a detailed discussion of the Amsterdam tippelzone.
9Since full decriminalization of prostitution was not legally enforceable in the 1980s and 1990s, cities
which opened a tippelzone simply applied selective decriminalization. They did so by enforcing more
strictly the by-laws and ordinances forbidding street prostitution anywhere other than in a tolerated
zone.
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a single night (Hulshof and Flight 2008).10 In the mid 2000s, some tippelzones
started experiencing difficulties due to an increasing number of prostitutes from
Eastern Europe and South America. To limit the number of prostitutes, some
tippelzones introduced a licensing system. Table 1 shows the moment licensing
was introduced. In some cities like Heerlen and Eindhoven the licensing sys-
tems were present from the start while others introduced them later to control
the inflow of new workers. Licensing systems favored known local prostitutes
and drug-addicted prostitutes. Flight, van Heerwaarden and Lugtmeijer (2003)
approximate that just before the licensing in Amsterdam 90 percent of the prosti-
tutes working in the tippelzone were illegal. The licensing in Arnhem reduced the
number of drug-addicted prostitutes by about one third.11 And also in Nijmegen
and Utrecht licensing effectively reduced the population of (illegal) prostitutes.
In all cities licensing was maintained adequately.
Table 1—Opening and closing of tippelzones in the Netherlands
City Opening year (month) Start licensing Closing year (month)
The Hague 1983 never 2006 (Mar.)
Utrecht 1986 2005 (Oct.)
Rotterdam 1994 (Nov.) 2003 (Apr.) 2005 (Sep.)
Amsterdam 1996 (Jan.) 2002 (Jun.) 2003 (Dec.)
Arnhem 1996 (Jun.) 2003 (Nov.)
Groningen 1998 (Jan.) never
Heerlen 2000 (Jun.) 2000 (Jun.) 2013 (Jan.)
Nijmegen 2000 (Oct.) 2007 (Sep.)
Eindhoven 2004 (Dec.) 2004 (Dec.) 2011 (May)
Note: Amsterdam did not formally have a licensing system but implemented
strict policing from June 2002 onwards verifying immigration status.
The Rotterdam tippelzone was notoriously turbulent mainly because of con-
flicts between prostitutes. Similar problems in The Hague and Amsterdam forced
the shutdown of the tippelzones in these three cities (Amsterdam in 2003, Rot-
terdam in 2005, The Hague in 2006). The tippelzone in Eindhoven closed in 2011
despite positive assessments, and in Heerlen in 2013 because too few prostitutes
were working there anymore. As of 2014, four tippelzones are still open across
the Netherlands. Korf et al. (2005) suggest that a small share of the prostitutes
previously working in Amsterdam, The Hague and Rotterdam moved to the tip-
pelzone in Utrecht. However, most were refused due to licensing restrictions from
other tippelzones and also barred from brothels, window soliciting and other legal
sex establishments which also require licensing.
The closing of tippelzones was controversial. Law enforcement agents were
the main supporters for closing tippelzones which they claimed acted as breed-
10On average, prostitutes in the Amsterdam charged around e25 for a standard service and earned
e80 a night. Prices, however, varied by the number of prostitutes present in the tippelzone.
11See the newpaper article: arnhemstad.nl (2007) Arnhemse tippelzone blijft open.
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ing grounds for illegal trafficking of women, blackmail, violence and kidnapping.
However, health workers claimed that neither street prostitutes nor the surround-
ing crime would disappear upon closing tippelzones. The problem would simply
spread to other areas in the city and go underground making it more difficult to
monitor (Van Soomeren 2004). Moreover, closing tippelzones would complicate
addressing health needs of prostitutes and would make them more vulnerable to
sexual abuse and violence.
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Figure 2. Supply and demand response to the introduction of licensing for the Nijmegen
tippelzone in September 2007
Source: Figure reproduced from Oostven 2008.
Oostven (2008) studies how clients in Nijmegen responded to shifts in the il-
legal segment of prostitutes in tippelzones due to the introduction of a licensing
system. Confronted with an increasing inflow of Eastern European prostitutes,
the tippelzone in Nijmegen introduced strict licensing in September 2007 ac-
companied by intensive police control during the first two weeks. Figure I.A
illustrates the response of prostitutes and clients. Immediately after the intro-
duction of the licensing system the number of prostitutes reduced from over 80
different prostitutes a month to about 35. This change was accompanied by a
30-35 percent reduction in the average number of clients. Although it is possible
that some clients stopped procuring by prostitutes, these parallel shifts suggest
that introducing the licensing system pushed a share of street prostitutes to the
underground market.
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B. Prostitution, Regulation and Crime
Several theories in crime location choice and crime displacement are relevant
to understand possible crime spillover effects of tippelzones. From a criminology
perspective, tippelzones can be seen as coordination ‘hot spots’ where the pros-
titution market attracts criminals who in turn attract other potential criminals.
Cohen and Felson (1979) label this convergence the routine activity approach.
Brantingham and Brantingham (1995) add to this that different urban struc-
tures and planning can change the pool of criminals by inducing new people into
criminal activity or by inhibiting the actions of existing criminals. Assuming the
probability of apprehension stays constant in all areas of the city, tippelzones can
increase crime by accelerating the process of convergence for drugs and human
trafficking, and by generating new opportunistic criminals.
However, given the higher probability of apprehension near the tippelzone, a
rational criminal (existing or potential) must weigh the expected gains from of-
fending against the probability of apprehension and the size of the punishment
(Becker 1968). Depending on the type of crime, criminals may then be incapaci-
tated or they may be forced to work at the outskirts of the tippelzones with lower
expected profit but also lower probability of apprehension (Deutsch and Epstein
1998). The presence of a tippelzone can, therefore, prevent some types of crime
from occurring by disenabling existing criminals and deterring future ones. For
example, a tippelzone should decrease sexual violence on street prostitutes who
relocate to the tippelzone, which is important considering the vulnerability of
street prostitutes. According to Venicz and Vanwesenbeeck (Venicz and Vanwe-
senbeeck 2000) almost half of the women in the sex industry in the Netherlands
experience some form of assault, sexual abuse, or other form of violence. In 47
percent of the cases the perpetrator was a client and in 37 percent of the cases
an (ex-)pimp.
Lee and Persson (2013) provide additional insight in how tippelzone opening
and regulation can influence the involvement of sex trafficking organizations. Ac-
cording to their theoretical model, a government which judges full elimination of
prostitution to be impractical or unattainable can instead prioritize reducing a
certain type of consumption, namely involuntary prostitution. Their model pre-
dicts that full criminalization of selling and buying sex, which they label the tra-
ditional model, will reduce trafficking relative to full legalization of the sex market
only after eliminating voluntary prostitution. This equilibrium is arguably sub-
optimal since it forces the entire sex market underground. An alternative model,
which they label the Dutch model, allows prostitutes to sell sex provided they
obtain a license after passing a background check. As long as voluntary prostitu-
tion exists, their model predicts that the Dutch model unambiguously decreases
trafficking relative to the full criminalization model given a fixed probability of
arrest for illegal prostitutes.
According to the model of Lee and Persson (2013), the supply and share of
involuntary prostitutes trafficked by organized criminal groups should be larger
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in cities with tippelzones that do not enforce a licensing system. This involve-
ment may increase other ‘transit’ crimes since organized criminal groups often
also engage in drug trafficking, smuggling illegal immigrants and arms traffick-
ing (Kruisbergen 2012).12 The introduction of a licensing system in previously
unregulated tippelzones should reduce involuntary prostitution in the tippelzone,
but it is unclear what spillovers to expect in other areas of the city. Ultimately,
we need an empirical analysis to evaluate the effect of a tippelzone on aggregate
crime in a city.
To the best of our knowledge, there exists no empirical study evaluating the
effects of regulating street prostitutes on crime.13 The closest study to ours is
Cunningham and Shah (2014) which exploits an unexpected legal change in the
state of Rhode Island that temporarily decriminalized indoor prostitution. They
find that decriminalization leads to a 31 percent decrease in reported rape offenses.
In addition, there are some empirical studies discussing spatial spillovers of crime
control (see Hesseling 1994, and Guerette and Bowers 2009, for overviews in
criminology).14 Weisburd et al. (2006) find that an increase in police surveillance
in two high-crime neighborhoods in Jersey City reduces drug-related crime both
within and around the targeted area. Di Tella and Schargrodsky (2004) and Draca
and Witt (2011) find no sign of displacement effects when focusing on exogenous
increases in the supply of police in specific areas in the wake of terrorist attacks.
Machin and Marie (2011) reach the same conclusion when looking at a street
crime initiative allocating extra resources to certain police force areas in England
and Wales.
II. Empirical Model
We use a difference-in-differences specification to study the effect of the presence
of a tippelzone on various types of crime. Let yit denote the observed crime in
city i in year t which in our simple baseline model is given by
(1) ln(yit) = αi + δdit + βxit + µt + uit
12Bruinsma and Meershoek (1999) study criminals arrested for sex trafficking in the Netherlands and
find that the associated criminal organizations range from two to three collaborators to very substantial
national or international organized crime networks.
13Akee et al. (2010) and Cho and Neumayer (2013) use national level data to investigate correla-
tions between prostitution legislation in different countries and constructed variables for sex-trafficking.
Their findings remain inconclusive since the constructed measures for trafficking are likely endogenous
to country legislation and institutions. The Dutch publication Trafficking in Human Beings: Visible
and Invisible. A quantitative report (Dutch-Rapporteur 2012) provides more detailed arguments on the
problems of measuring human trafficking at a national level.
14Displacement of crime can also be intertemporal or by changing target, offense, tactic, or offender.
Adda, McConnell and Rasul (2014) find that depenalization of cannabis possession in small quantities
leads to an increase in offences for large quantity cannabis possession. Jacob, Lefgren and Moretti (2007)
focus on weather shocks and show that criminals who are prevented from committing property offenses
in a given week try to compensate for lost income by engaging in higher levels of criminal activity in
subsequent weeks.
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The city fixed effects are captured by αi and the time trend µt is modeled using
year fixed effects. The variable dit denotes if city i had an open tippelzone in
year t, and xit describes other time-varying regressors. In the estimation we
use a logarithmic specification for our outcome variable to deal with the larger
variation in crime in larger cities. Therefore, our parameter of interest δ represents
the proportional effect of a tippelzone on local crime.
However, we are not only interested in the overall effect of a tippelzone, but
also in different regulation systems in tippelzones. For this reason, in most of our
empirical analyses we consider the extended baseline model
(2) ln(yit) = αi + δ0d
−
it + δ1lit + δ2d
+
it + βxit + µt + uit
The variables d−it and d
+
it take value one if in city i in year t there was a tippelzone
which opened without a licensing system (-) or with a licensing system (+),
respectively. The variable lit denotes the presence of a licensing system which
was introduced some time period after the opening. So, lit can only take value
one if initially there was a tippelzone without licensing, so if d−it equals one.
The parameters of interest are δ0, δ1 and δ2. If δ0 = δ2, then enforcing a
licensing system upon opening the tippelzone has no additional effect on crime.
And if δ1 = δ2 − δ0, then implementing a licensing system immediately or after
some time has the same effect on crime. In order to give a causal interpretation
to δ0, δ1 and δ2 we assume that cities would have followed a common time trend
in crime were it not for the changes in tippelzone policy. We give evidence in
support of this assumption in subsection III.A.
It is not unlikely that crime rates within cities are serially correlated. Given
that our data only contain 25 cities, we produce statistical inference based on the
Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) wild bootstrap approach. The associated
wild bootstrap standard errors turn out only slightly larger than the usual Huber-
White cluster robust standard errors. As additional robustness checks on the
parameters and standard errors we also estimate the model using polynomial
time trends and specifying an AR(1) process for the error terms. Our results
are robust to these alternatives so we present only the results from our main
specification which imposes less structure on the model.15 In Subsection IV.E
we also present a placebo analysis following Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan
(2004) to show the robustness of the wild bootstrap standard errors.
III. Registered Crime Data
Our data are made available by Statistics Netherlands and contain administra-
tive records of crime reports collected by the Dutch Prosecutor General (PG). We
observe the total annual number of reports for different crime categories rounded
to the nearest fifth integer for the 25 largest municipalities. The balanced panel
15The data and STATA programming code for all results are available at www.skastoryano.com.
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data cover the period 1994-2011. Our crime outcome variables are sexual abuse
and rape, drug crime (excessive drug possession, processing or trafficking), as-
saults and illegal weapon possession.16 The latter two give an indication about
the presence of criminal networks. Our motivation for focusing on these crime
categories is their frequent association with prostitutes and trafficking organiza-
tions as described in subsection I.B. We provide a more thorough description of
all variables in Table 12 in the appendix.
The first panel of Table 2 presents the average yearly crime rates during our ob-
servation period. We distinguish between the three largest cities which all had a
tippelzone (Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague), the six medium-sized cities
which opened a tippelzone (Utrecht, Eindhoven, Groningen, Arnhem, Nijmegen
and Heerlen), and the sixteen medium-sized cities which never opened a tippel-
zone. Larger cities have, on average, higher crime rates, with the exception of
drug-related crime. Average crime rates in medium-sized cities with and without
tippelzones are very similar, but again the exception is drug-related crime. In
general, drug-related crime rates are slightly higher in cities with tippelzones.
The second panel describes characteristics of the cities. Tippelzones cities have,
on average, more inhabitants and are more densely populated. Other character-
istics do not differ substantially. On average, about 35 percent of the total popu-
lation are men between 15 and 65 years old. Individuals in cities with tippelzones
are somewhat higher educated but have a slightly lower average household in-
come. Medium-size cities and cities without a tippelzone have a similar amount
of immigrants and both have lower amounts than large cities. There are also
no differences in the share of social insurance benefits recipients between cities.
Finally, although tippelzones are not a partisan policy, they were still opposed
on moral grounds by the Christian Union (CU) which is evident in the table.
Among the other parties there is no clear relation between the political party of
the mayor and whether the city has a tippelzone.17
A. Assessing Crime Trends
As mentioned in section II, our key identifying assumption is that cities fol-
low a common trend in crime. This common trend assumption imposes that,
withholding any effect of opening a tippelzone or enforcing a licensing system,
tippelzone cities and non-tippelzone cities would have followed the same trend
in aggregate crime. It excludes, for instance, the possibility that tippelzones are
responses to city-specific increases in aggregate crime, that other crime-targeting
policies were introduced at the same time as tippelzones, or that the introduction
of tippelzones produced spillovers in crime to other cities.
16Since the data are based on records from the police administration, there is likely underreporting
for certain types of crime. This problem may be particularly relevant for sexual crime and some types
of violent crime committed on people fearing extradition, incarceration or social stigma from reporting.
17In the Netherlands mayors are not elected, but appointed. The political power of mayors is, therefore,
limited. Cities often have mayors from the same political party for a long period.
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Table 2—Crime rates for cities with and without tippelzones (s.d. in brackets)
Tippelzone No Tippelzone
big cities medium cities
Annual crime reports per 1000 inhabitants
Sexual Abuse & Rape 0.18 [0.05] 0.15 [0.06] 0.14 [0.07]
Sexual Abuse 0.08 [0.02] 0.06 [0.03] 0.07 [0.05]
Rape 0.10 [0.03] 0.09 [0.04] 0.07 [0.04]
Drugs 1.49 [0.53] 1.56 [1.00] 1.28 [1.42]
Assault 2.13 [0.86] 1.87 [0.59] 1.79 [0.58]
Weapons 0.56 [0.14] 0.44 [0.25] 0.42 [0.51]
City characteristics
Population 597,489 [115,163] 172,419 [54,891] 113,114 [35,475]
Density (Popul. per km2) 4326 [1135] 2298 [505] 1956 [1456]
Males 15-65 210,145 [45,886] 61,702 [20,054] 39,226 [12,739]
Household Income (1000 e) 29.05 [1.34] 28.99 [2.00] 30.50 [1.85]
Higher education (percent) 0.30 [0.08] 0.32 [0.09] 0.25 [0.07]
Immigrants (percent) 0.11 [0.02] 0.06 [0.02] 0.05 [0.02]
Benefits recipients (percent) 0.07 [0.01] 0.08 [0.02] 0.08 [0.01]
Political party of mayor
Socialist (PVDA) 0.48 [0.50] 0.56 [0.50] 0.41 [0.49]
Christian (CDA or CU) 0.26 [0.44] 0.12 [0.33] 0.31 [0.46]
Liberal (VVD or D66) 0.26 [0.44] 0.32 [0.47] 0.28 [0.45]
Note: 3 big cities with a tippelzone include Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague. 6 medium cities
with a tippelzone include Utrecht, Eindhoven, Groningen, Nijmegen, Heerlen and Arnhem. 16 cities
without tippelzone include Almelo, Breda, Deventer, Dordrecht, Enschede, Haarlem, Helmond, Hengelo,
Leeuwarden, Leiden, Maastricht, Schiedam, Tilburg, Venlo, Zwolle and ’s-Hertogenbosch.
To justify the common trend assumption, we exploit the variation between cities
in the moment of opening tippelzones. In Figure 3 we present the city crime rates
to check for diverging trends prior to the opening of a tippelzone. Each grey line in
the Figure represents the difference between the logarithm of the crime outcome
in a city which opened a tippelzone and its predicted control crime trend. The
black line is the average for the medium size cities. To calculate the predicted
control crime trend for a city i, we first estimate model 2 on all cities. We then
set δ0 = δ1 = δ2 = 0 and average the fitted values leaving out city i and the three
largest cities. This procedure allows us to standardize the opening time to the
year before the tippelzone was first introduced (marked at 0).
Besides a level difference18, the trends in crime show no systematic increases
or decreases in sexual abuse and rape relative to their predicted control group
in the years prior to opening a zone. However, all medium-sized cities show a
sharp decrease in sexual abuse and rape immediately following the opening of a
18In our empirical analysis the level differences in crime will be captured by the city fixed effects αi.
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tippelzone both for cities which enforced a licensing system (Eindhoven, Heerlen)
and those which did not (Nijmegen, Arnhem, Groningen). The decrease in the
first two years is in the order of (exp(−0.4)− 1)× 100% ≈ −33%.
We only observe one pre-opening period for Rotterdam, two pre-opening periods
for Amsterdam, and none for The Hague. This also means we can not use past
crime rates to inspect pre-opening trends for these cities. Also, the three large
cities closed tippelzones in a span of three years which implies that most of the
identifying power for these large cities comes from comparison with medium-sized
cities. For this reason we limit most of the subsequent analysis and discussion to
medium-sized cities.
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Figure 3. Crime rates in cities with a tippelzone compared to cities without a tippelzone
Note: The no-tippelzone counterfactual for a city i is generated by estimating model (2) on twenty-one
cities leaving out city i and the three largest cities and then averaging the fitted values fixing d−it = 0,
lit = 0 and d
+
it = 0.
Figures 5 and VI in the appendix provide more evidence in favor of the common
trend assumption. In particular, these figures show that prior to opening the
tippelzones trends between cities for the different types of crime are very similar
and the same holds for the crime trend prior to introducing a licensing system.
IV. Estimation results: registered crime
In this section we first discuss the results from our baseline model on registered
crime data. Next, we look at time varying effects and study possible spillover
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effects between cities. Finally, we provide some robustness analyses and discuss
our findings.
A. Baseline results
Table 3—Effect of opening a tippelzone and licensing on citywide registered crime
S.A.&Rape Sex Ab. Rape S.A.&Rape Sex Ab. Rape
Simple baseline model:
22 cities with covariates 25 cities with covariates
Tippelzone -0.175** -0.379** -0.027 -0.144** -0.302*** -0.042
(0.085) (0.150) (0.136) (0.060) (0.113) (0.052)
N (city x year) 395 395 395 450 450 450
R2 0.63 0.43 0.55 0.82 0.69 0.77
Extended baseline model:
22 cities with covariates 25 cities with covariates
Open noLic.(δ0) -0.198* -0.358 -0.090 -0.205* -0.304 -0.133
(0.105) (0.262) (0.077) (0.109) (0.195) (0.097)
Intro. Lic.(δ1) 0.286 0.413** 0.220 0.168 0.250* 0.115
(0.254) (0.187) (0.290) (0.145) (0.146) (0.200)
Open Lic.(δ2) -0.184** -0.447** 0.012 -0.169* -0.411*** 0.004
(0.073) (0.154) (0.092) (0.097) (0.142) (0.034)
Closing 0.023 0.160 -0.045
(0.222) (0.191) (0.187)
N (city x year) 395 395 395 450 450 450
R2 0.63 0.44 0.55 0.82 0.69 0.77
City fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01. Significance (and standard errors in parenthesis) based on
Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) wild bootstrap approach with 499 replications; Based on yearly data
over the period 1994-2011. ‘S.A.&Rape’ is Sexual Abuse and Rape. The 22 cities exclude the large cities,
Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague (and Eindhoven in 2011). Covariates are indicators for political
party of mayor, log(population male 15-65), log(pop. density), income (percent), immigrants (percent),
unemployment insurance recipients (percent), higher educated (percent).
The upper panel of Table 3 shows the estimation results on the simple baseline
model only considering the effect of an open tippelzone. The left frame presents re-
sults using data on the 22 medium-sized cities, the right frame also takes the three
large cities into account.19 The results show that an open tippelzone significantly
19In Tables 13 and 14 in the appendix we present additional results without covariates and specifica-
tions which include a two year lead dummy to check for pre-opening shifts in crime.
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reduces citywide sexual abuse and rape by about (exp(−0.175) − 1) × 100% ≈
−16%. This effect is mainly driven by about a 32 percent reduction in sexual
abuse. The results are not very sensitive to including the three largest cities in
our sample.
The bottom panel of Table 3 shows estimation results for the extended base-
line model which also takes regulation of tippelzone into account. The effects of
opening a tippelzone are very similar regardless of whether licensing was imposed
from the start. However, we find that introducing licensing later substantially in-
creases sexual abuse and rape, and the effect is significant for sexual abuse. These
opposite effects of licensing are not contradictory. Cities which immediately im-
posed licensing initially distributed licenses to all known street prostitutes but
barred future entrants. Non-licensed tippelzones allowed free entry and there-
fore attracted a large share of foreign prostitutes, in particular Eastern European
prostitutes after the opening of EU borders (Flight, van Heerwaarden and Lugt-
meijer 2003). When licensing was later enforced in these non-licensed zones, a
large fraction of prostitutes as well as clients were sent away from tippelzones to
less controlled environments (see again Figure I.A). If tippelzones attract crimi-
nals, then the criminal environment in a city prior to opening a tippelzone may
be different than the environment in a tippelzone which has been open for several
years. We postpone further discussion of the results to subsection IV.C.
The right panel of Table 3 shows estimation results for the sample including
the three large cities. Since these three cities closed their tippelzone during our
observation period we can also allow for an effect of closing the tippelzone. The
effects of closing are never significant. Furthermore, the other estimated effects
are quite robust against including the three large cities.
B. Time-Varying Effects Sexual Abuse and Rape
A tippelzone is introduced at a specific moment in time but the composition of
prostitutes changes continuously in a city. Delayed market responses from sex-
trafficking organizations or capacity restrictions inside the zones may produce
time-varying effects of tippelzones. We explore this in Table 4 where we split the
opening effects of tippelzones into short-run and medium to long-run effects. In
particular, we allow for different effects in the first two years after opening and
afterwards. All effects (except the ex-post licensing) describe proportional shifts
from the pre-opening crime levels. As in the baseline specification, the effect of
ex-post licensing represents a proportional shift compared to the presence of a
tippelzone without licensing.
The results in the first column show clear differences between short and long-
run effects. The negative effect on sexual abuse and rape observed in the baseline
specification is driven by sharp decreases in crime in the first two years after
opening. The average decrease in sexual abuse in the first two years of opening is
40 percent for cities with a licensed tippelzone and 32 percent for cities with free
16 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
Table 4—Time-varying effects and robustness checks on citywide sexual abuse and rape (22
cities)
Dep. variable: Sexual Abuse & Rape Sex Ab. Rape
pre-opening 0.062
(0.063)
1st-2nd year -0.385*** -0.350*** -0.377*** -0.350*** -0.369*** -0.438** -0.325**
Open noLic. (0.133) (0.121) (0.130) (0.121) (0.127) (0.199) (0.164)
3rd+ year -0.131 -0.054 -0.061 -0.024 -0.064 -0.269 0.029
Open noLic. (0.112) (0.127) (0.108) (0.143) (0.115) (0.225) (0.115)
pre-Intro Lic. -0.202
(0.201)
Intro. Lic. 0.252 0.180 0.196 0.163 0.186 0.306 0.144
(0.247) (0.174) (0.210) (0.171) (0.184) (0.198) (0.312)
1st-2nd year -0.518*** -0.499*** -0.525*** -0.525*** -0.543*** -0.944*** -0.238
Open Lic. (0.179) (0.172) (0.181) (0.181) (0.188) (0.326) (0.245)
3rd+ year -0.062 -0.046 -0.065 -0.065 -0.051 -0.295* 0.123
Open Lic. (0.055) (0.057) (0.053) (0.053) (0.060) (0.159) (0.132)
Spill. Lic. -0.003 0.030 0.038 0.104 0.029
(0.048) (0.102) (0.093) (0.152) (0.186)
Spill. Closing -0.057 -0.096 -0.109 -0.294 -0.039
(0.153) (0.253) (0.258) (0.362) (0.205)
Ban lift -0.094 -0.072 -0.050 -0.082
(0.169) (0.201) (0.191) (0.299)
Spill. Tipp. yes yes yes
N (city x year) 395 395 395 395 395 395 395
R2 0.64 0.64 0.64 0.63 0.63 0.44 0.55
P-val(F1,2) 0.55 0.48 0.51 0.43 0.44 0.19 0.77
P-val(F3,+) 0.58 0.96 0.98 0.79 0.92 0.93 0.59
City f.e. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year D. yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes yes
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01. Significance (and standard errors in parenthesis) based on
Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) wild bootstrap approach with 499 replications; Based on yearly data
over the period 1994-2011. The 22 cities exclude the large cities Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague (and
Eindhoven in 2011). Covariates are indicators for political party of mayor, log(population male 15-65),
log(pop. density), income (percent), immigrants (percent), unemployment insurance recipients (percent),
higher educated (percent). Pval(F1,2) is the p-value for the test H0 : 1st-2nd year Open noLic.=1st-2nd
year Open Lic. and Pval(F3,+) is the p-value for the test H0 : 3rd+ year Open noLic.=3rd+ year
Open Lic.
entry zones, and the difference between the two is insignificant.20 Beyond the first
two years there is no difference in crime relative to the pre-opening period. The
ex-post introduction of licensing again increases sex-related crime. The effect is
substantial, but lacks power to be significant.
The second column of the table provides evidence for the common trend as-
sumption by including indicators for pre-opening and pre-licensing periods. These
variables take value one in the two years before opening a tippelzone or introduc-
20The p-values in the table show that the difference in the time-varying effect between tippelzones
with an without licensing is never significant.
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ing licensing. As expected from Figure 3 we do not find any sign of pre-opening
shifts in crime. Introducing these lead dummies also does not influence our pa-
rameter estimates of interest. This supports the assumption of a common trend
in sex-related crime between cities with and without a tippelzone, and with and
without licensing.
To interpret our findings as causal effects we must exclude that crime shifts
non-randomly between cities following the opening of a tippelzone or changes
in licensing policy. As discussed in subsection I.A, case workers reported some
displacement of prostitutes from closed tippelzones to zones in other cities. We
therefore include in the third column of Table 4 variables for spillover effects from
closed tippelzones (Spillover Closing) or from zones which introduced a licensing
system (Spillover Lic.) dispelling illegal workers. These variables are non-zero
only for cities which had an open tippelzone without a licensing system. The
spillover variable for these cities increases in increments of one for every newly
closed or newly licensed tippelzone. For example, Utrecht Spillover Lic. takes
value zero up until 2001 and after 2005, but takes value one in 2002, two in 2003,
and three in 2004-2005 as licensing was introduced in Amsterdam, Rotterdam and
Arnhem. Similarly, the variable Spillover Closing for Utrecht takes value zero up
until 2003 and after 2005 but takes value one in 2004-2005 due to the closing of
the Amsterdam tippelzone.21
Our results do not indicate any shifts in sexual abuse or rape due to spillovers.
This is not surprising. The movements of prostitutes were limited since the closing
of tippelzones in Rotterdam, Amsterdam and The Hague occurred simultaneously
with the introduction of licensing systems in other cities which refused new en-
trants into tippelzones. We also do not find in the fourth column any effect of
the end of the brothel ban on crime in the cities with free entry zones.22
In the last three columns we account for possible crime spillovers to neighbour-
ing cities. In this model, we include three additional spillover indicator variables,
one for each of d−it , lit and d
+
it . These variables turn on and off for any control
city within 50km of a city which opened a tippelzone or introduced a licensing
system. These spillover effects will capture any displacement effects of crime to
cities within a 50km radius of a tippelzone city at the moment the latter opens
a tippelzone or changes it’s licensing regulation. The parameters of interest for
sexual violence remain unaffected and the spillover effects23 show no reversed
changes in crime in neighbouring cities.24 The final two columns reproduce these
same results for sexual abuse and rape separately. The decreases in sexual abuse
are stronger in cities with licensed tippelzones. Furthermore, we find that the re-
21We also estimated the models with dummy variables for spillovers. None of these specifications show
significant spillover effects or relevant changes in our parameters of interest.
22The variable brothel ban lift takes value one in cities with an open tippelzone and no licensing system
in 2001 or later, and zero otherwise.
23The results are presented fully in Table 15 of the appendix.
24When estimating a model with saturated spillover effects (not presented), the parameters on 1st-2nd
year open Lic. and 1st-2nd year open noLic. are close to zero in magnitude and insignificant.
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ductions in sexual abuse persist beyond the first year in cities which implemented
licensing from the start.
C. Discussion of effects on sexual violence
The opening of a tippelzone with or without a licensing system is correlated
with a short-run decrease of 30 − 40 percent in sexual abuse and rape, and the
results are robust to different specifications. A first possibility is that the reduc-
tions follow directly from a decrease in sexual violence on prostitutes. A survey of
street prostitutes in the Nijmegen tippelzone reports that 27 percent were victim
of abuse and 16 percent were raped in the previous year alone (Oostven 2008).
Despite this high sexual violence, 95 percent of the interviewed prostitutes report
feeling safer within the tippelzone. The study explains these seemingly contra-
dictory findings by the fact that most prostitutes also work during the day for
private clients in more insecure settings.25 Tippelzones may, therefore, directly
reduce crime on street prostitutes by providing a relatively safe and controlled
working environment.
However, limiting the explanation to street prostitutes may obscure effects on
a wider group of victimized women in the population. Indeed, street prostitutes
are a prominent example of a group which shies away from reporting crime due
to their illegal status and drug addiction. In particular, among the window,
escort and club prostitutes interviewed in Venicz and Vanwesenbeeck (2000) 71
percent respond to have withheld reporting one or several personal incidents to
the police in the previous year. The main reasons are fear for reprisals by their
procurers, and lack of hope and trust in the police. According to Van Soomeren
(Van Soomeren 2004), tippelzones actually provide support to immigrants whose
illegal status and lack of knowledge of their rights prevent them from seeking help
from officials. If this support increases reporting sexual abuse and rape, then our
estimated effect is an underestimate of the true effect.
A second possibility is that opening a tippelzone leads to a decrease in sexual
violence on women more generally by providing an anonymous, appealing and
easily accessible outlet for sex to otherwise violent individuals.26 Under the theo-
retical predictions of subsection I.B, a tippelzone may attract potential instigators
of sexual abuse and rape but have the effect of diffusing sexual violence elsewhere
in the city. If this type of substitution behavior occurs, then the opening effect
of tippelzones may reflect reductions in sexual abuse and rape on all women, not
only on prostitutes. Without more precise data on the victims of sexual violence
we can not separate these two hypotheses.
A last possibility is that the decreases in sexual violence are driven by changes
in crime reporting behavior. Inside the tippelzones, prostitutes may be encour-
25A larger survey of prostitutes in nine countries reports that 71 percent have been physically assaulted
and 63 percent have been raped while working as prostitutes (?).
26Farley et al. (2011) find that 15 percent of sex buyers reveal that “they would rape a woman if they
could get away with it and if no one knew about it” in comparison with 2 percent for non-sex buyers.
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aged to report certain types of crime such as sexual violence more often or the
police may register crime themselves more frequently. This would imply that our
estimates provide a lower bound to the estimated effects. However, potential crim-
inals may have shifted their crime to victims with a different propensity to report
crime than their previous victims. For instance, in the case of sexual crime, we
must exclude that upon the opening of a tippelzone potential criminals of sexual
violence switch to new victims who are less willing to report sexual assaults and
rapes than those women (prostitutes or others) who were previously victimized.
We cannot test this type of substitution empirically. However, it is unclear why
the change in victimized individuals would operate in such a way, in particular
given the low propensity of street prostitutes to report crime. Furthermore, Re-
garding policing behavior, we did not find strong arguments or articles describing
citywide policing efforts to have changed concurrently and systematically with
the opening of a tippelzone.27
Overall, we find only weak evidence of long-run effects for cities with and with-
out licensing. For tippelzones without a licensing system, one explanation for why
the initial reductions in crime fade away over time is that increased competition
over time in the tippelzones forced some prostitutes to seek opportunities in other
less safe areas thereby becoming victim of more sexual abuse and rape.28 This in-
terpretation can also explain the increases in sexual violence following the ex-post
introduction of licensing systems. A last possibility is that time-varying effects are
due to changes in monitoring by the police force. While there exists no longitudi-
nal data on police monitoring, reports on tippelzones do not mention structural
changes or substantial reductions in monitoring (e.g. Flight, van Heerwaarden
and Lugtmeijer 2003; Hulshof and Flight 2008; Oostven 2008; Van Soomeren
2004). The only significant policy changes are regulation by introducing a licens-
ing system. For tippelzones with licensing, there were capacity limitations set on
the number of workers within these zones. The constant inflow and turnover of
prostitutes means the later entrants were forced to work in less safe areas outside
of the zones. If we consider the reductions in sexual violence to affect women
more generally, then the fading out of effects in the medium to long-run may
reflect a short-lived thrill effect of tippelzones for potential offenders.
D. Drugs, Illegal Weapons and Assaults
Recall that one of the initial goals of tippelzones was to remove the nuisance
created by drug-addicted prostitutes, their pimps and their clients. Furthermore,
when licensing systems were enforced, they favored drug-addicted prostitutes. For
these reasons, we next focus on crimes related to drugs and violence. We again
consider our baseline model.
27Information on the size of the police force is only available from 2005 onwards.
28It is difficult to verify this re-sprawl in the data by, for example, looking at the number of arrests for
street prostitution. This is because soliciting by prostitutes comes under the crime category of ‘Public
order offenses’ which includes a wide variety of other public disturbances.
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The first column of Table 5 explores possible effects of tippelzones and their reg-
ulation on drug crime. Our estimation results follow the theoretical predictions,
but only when tippelzones enforce licensing. In those cities, we find a significant
decrease of approximately 25 percent in drug crime. The results are robust to
different specifications and persist beyond the first two years (presented in Tables
14 and 15 in the appendix). This suggests that in cities which enforced licensed
tippelzones from the start local governments achieved one of their stated goals to
address drug problems related to prostitutes.
Table 5—Effect of tippelzone on citywide registered crime
Drugs Weapons Assault Drugs Weapons Assault
Simple baseline model:
22 cities with covariates 25 cities with covariates
Tippelzone -0.191 -0.083 0.093 -0.057 -0.074 -0.017
(0.150) (0.201) (0.075) (0.084) (0.101) (0.048)
N (city x year) 395 395 395 450 450 450
R2 0.81 0.76 0.89 0.89 0.90 0.95
22 cities with covariates 25 cities with covariates
Extended baseline model:
Open noLic. (δ0) -0.034 0.052 0.139 -0.067 0.002 0.113
(0.286) (0.113) (0.115) (0.153) (0.083) (0.102)
Intro. Lic. (δ1) -0.244 -0.095 -0.053 -0.155 -0.070 0.030
(0.260) (0.156) (0.154) (0.113) (0.136) (0.120)
Open Lic. (δ2) -0.324** -0.210 0.052 -0.284** -0.168 0.034
(0.128) (0.351) (0.105) (0.125) (0.335) (0.141)
Closing -0.124 0.095 0.207
(0.145) (0.110) (–)
N (city x year) 395 395 395 450 450 450
R2 0.81 0.76 0.89 0.89 0.89 0.95
City fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01. Significance (and standard errors in parenthesis) based on
Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) wild bootstrap approach with 499 replications; Based on yearly data
over the period 1994-2011. Wild bootstrap procedure fails on closing parameter for Assaults. The 22 cities
exclude the large cities Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague (and Eindhoven in 2011). Covariates are
indicators for political party of mayor, log(population male 15-65), log(pop. density), income (percent),
immigrants (percent), unemployment insurance recipients (percent), higher educated (percent).
It is likely that the effects on drug crime are driven by changes in policing
behavior due to the policy goals of tippelzones. Before tippelzones opened, arrest
for drug crimes was the main response to complaints by local residents about
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drug dealing to addicted prostitutes. One of the main objectives of tippelzones
was to reduce the nuisance rather than the drug dealing itself. Therefore, the
police did not prioritorize arresting street prostitutes and pimps for drug dealing
in and around the tippelzone.29 The combination of these factors could explain
the decrease in drug crime. Also, health care providers present in tippelzones
may have had some small influence on the drug use of prostitutes.
The theoretical models also predict that cities with non-licensed tippelzones are
more likely to attract prostitutes trafficked from the underground sex industry
since they provide fewer barriers to entry. If trafficking organizations are associ-
ated to trafficking of drugs, weapons or more violent crimes, then opening a free
entry tippelzone may produce unforeseen spillovers on aggregate city crime. Our
panel estimation results in the second and third columns of Table 5 do not give
evidence for spillovers on illegal weapons or violent assaults.
E. Falsification analyses
In this subsection we provide some additional analysis to obtain insight in the
validity of our identification. We first focus on types of crime that are not likely
associated to tippelzones, but are considered to be strongly related to city-wide
monitoring by the police force. Next, we discuss a placebo analysis.
We start by considering the effects of tippelzones on theft (without assault),
public-order offense and public violence. These are types of crime which are
typically not directly associated to prostitution, drug use or organized crime,
but can be affected by police monitoring. Estimating the effects of opening a
tippelzone and introducing licensing on these additional crime categories has two
purposes. First, to establish that the policy surrounding a tippelzone is not part of
a more extensive policy to reduce crime. Were this the case, then we would expect
the effects on theft, public-order offenses and public violence to parallel those on
sexual violence. And second, there may be substitution if the tippelzone diverts
police attention away from other tasks. The left part of Table 6 does not show any
significant or substantial effects of opening a tippelzone and introducing licensing
on theft, public-order offenses and public violence. These results therefore do not
indicate any signs that the effects on sexual violence and drug crime are due to
coinciding changes in citywide crime control policies.
Next, we provide a placebo analysis for the estimated effects of our baseline
models. More specifically, we follow Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004) by
randomly generating placebo moments of opening a tippelzone for cities that never
actually had a tippelzone. For each draw of placebo interventions we estimate
the effect of the tippelzone which provides us with the distribution of estimated
treatment effects under the null hypothesis that there is no effect of tippelzones.30
29This guideline of turning a blind-eye to drug dealing around tippelzones became a key point of
contention when discussing the closing of tippelzones (Van Soomeren 2004).
30For the extended baseline model we follow the same procedure but randomly draw combinations of
opening with or without licensing, or imposing licensing ex-post.
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We draw placebo interventions 999 times and calculate the p-values as the number
of times the placebo estimate is larger than the estimate using the real tippelzone
cities. These one-sided p-values for significance are shown in brackets in Table
6 and show that our placebo inference follow closely our results in Table 3 and
Table 5.
V. Perceived Crime
The second data source is the Population Police Monitor (PPM) which exam-
ines perceived crime and safety.31 This nationwide survey was conducted every
other year from 1993 to 2001 and annually from 2001 to 2006. Respondents are
contacted by telephone and are asked questions about victimization, feelings of
safety, contact with police, and crime in their neighborhood. The participation
rate in the survey ranges from 46 percent to 72 percent with higher participation
in later years.
We focus on two questions concerning the perception of drug crime and vio-
lent crime: “Is drug nuisance common in your neighborhood?” and “Is violent
crime common in your neighborhood?”. The question on drug crime only entered
the survey in 1997. Answers can take four alternatives: (1) Happens regularly,
(2) Happens sometimes, (3) Never happens/Hardly ever happens, and (4) Don’t
know/No opinion. This dataset also includes the four digit postal code of each
respondent which allows us to define their proximity to the tippelzone. In the
analysis, we take all postcodes for the 25 largest Dutch municipalities based on
the geographic delimitations defined by Statistics Netherlands.
Table 7—Crime rates for tippelzone and non-tippelzone cities
Tippelzone No Tippelzone
big cities medium cities
Fraction perceiving Drug Crime
Often 0.15 0.11 0.10
Sometimes 0.20 0.17 0.15
Never 0.62 0.70 0.73
Fraction perceiving Violent Crime
Often 0.09 0.05 0.05
Sometimes 0.27 0.21 0.19
Never 0.59 0.70 0.73
Note: 3 big cities with a tippelzone include Amsterdam, Rotterdam and The Hague. 6 medium cities
with a tippelzone include Utrecht, Eindhoven, Groningen, Nijmegen, Heerlen and Arnhem. 16 cities
without tippelzone include Almelo, Breda, Deventer, Dordrecht, Enschede, Haarlem, Helmond, Hengelo,
Leeuwarden, Leiden, Maastricht, Schiedam, Tilburg, Venlo, Zwolle and ’s-Hertogenbosch.
31This survey (in Dutch: Politie Monitor Bevolking) is conducted by two research bureaus commis-
sioned by the Dutch Ministry of Security and Justice: B&A Groep Beleidsonderzoek & - Advies BV,
and Intomart BV.
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Table 7 presents the fraction of answers within each perceived crime category.
For medium-sized cities, about 70 percent of respondents indicate that violent
crime and drug crime are never or hardly ever observed. Approximately 10 per-
cent respond that drug nuisance occurs regularly and about 5 percent claim that
violent crime happens regularly. Again there are differences between the three
largest cities and the rest of the sample. A graphical analysis (not presented)
shows that the trends in these larger cities differ from the rest. For these reasons,
we focus the empirical analysis of perceived crime on the 22 medium-sized cities.
Figure 4. Trends in registered and perceived crime
Figure 4a shows how perceived crimes change over time. The trends for all
response categories remain relatively constant during the observation period. For
comparison we show in Figure 4b the trends in registered crime. The public
perception of violent crime does not in general follow the trend in reported crime.
As for perceived drug crime, drug-related registered crime shows no trend but
the difference in trends for violence is clear. Perceived violent crime is slightly
decreasing over time, whereas registered violent crime shows a strong increase
until 2007 and then a drop until 2010.
A. Estimation Results for Perceived Crime
We repeat the difference-in-differences analysis with the perceived crime data.
The outcome variable is an indicator which takes value one if a person responds
that she is experiencing nuisance from drugs or violence often (or sometimes) in
her surrounding. Given the binary outcome, we are estimating a linear proba-
bility model. We control for individual characteristics (gender, age, education,
nationality) and the same city characteristics as in the registered crime analysis.
We cluster standard errors at the postcode level since they are more conservative
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than those when clustering at the city level.
Table 8 presents results from our baseline models for medium-sized cities. Since
residents may react differently depending upon their proximity to the tippelzone,
we stratify the regression by within city locality. We define the tippelzone area as
the postcode in which the tippelzone is located as well as any adjacent postcode.
The upper panel shows that perceived drug nuisance due to the presence of a
tippelzone is significantly higher in neighborhoods not located near the tippelzone.
However, the bottom panel shows that this only holds for non-licensed tippelzones.
There are no significant effects in the tippelzone area. Furthermore, our baseline
specifications do not show significant effects on violence.
Our extended baseline specification does not account for changes in public per-
ception over time. Changes in perception may, for example, arise because media
attention on tippelzones was stronger around opening periods and periods of intro-
ducing licensing. Table 9 considers the further extended model with time-varying
effects in perceived drug nuisance which we specified earlier for registered crime.
The first two columns focus on often perceived drug nuisance and show opposing
effects depending on the licensing system and the proximity to the tippelzone.
In the first two years after opening, perceived drug nuisance in non-tippelzone
areas increases by 5.8 percentage-points in cities which did not open a tippelzone
with a licensing system from the start. After the first two years, perceived drug
crime in those areas still remains higher than in the pre-opening period. These
are large impacts since on average only 10 percent of the residents respond that
drug nuisance occurs often.
In contrast, residents in non-tippelzone areas of cities which introduced licensing
from the start do not see an initial increase in crime but perceive a 5.3 percentage-
point reduction in drug nuisance in the medium to long-run. In addition, residents
in areas adjacent to the tippelzone perceive an 4.2 percentage-point increase in
drug nuisance in the medium to long-run. Although these results are identified
only on two cities which immediately enforced a licensing system, they suggest
that drug nuisance was successfully re-located to the tippelzone areas.
The third and fourth column of Table 9 for “often or sometimes” perceived drug
crime mostly follow the patterns observed in the first two columns. However, per-
ceived drug nuisance also increases for the first two years in non-tippelzone areas
of cities which enforced licensing immediately upon opening.32 We also notice
that perceived drug nuisance increased already prior to opening a tippelzone.
These shifts may be due to media coverage of the announcement that a tippel-
zone would be opened. Again, we do not observe any change in perceived drug
nuisance in response to the introduction of ex-post licensing.
The results for non-tippelzone areas are consistent with reports for tippelzones
32Note that the response categories are exclusive. For this reason, if fewer residents responding “often”
then the share of “sometimes” responses is likely to increase. This can explain some of the changes in
parameter - e.g. −0.053 in the “often” response regression and −0.016 in the “often or sometimes”
regression for 3rd+ year Open Lic. in non-tippelzone areas.
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Table 9—Within city effects of tippelzone on perceived crime (22 cities with covariates)
Drugs: Often Drugs: Often/Some.
Non-Tipp. Tipp. Non-Tipp. Tipp.
area area area area
pre-opening 0.008 0.012 0.032* 0.057**
(0.013) (0.027) (0.017) (0.022)
1st-2nd year Open noLic. 0.058*** 0.000 0.064*** 0.051
(0.022) (0.034) (0.023) (0.032)
3rd+ year Open noLic. 0.047* 0.032 0.079** 0.082*
(0.027) (0.040) (0.032) (0.049)
Introduce Lic. 0.015 0.011 0.025 -0.022
(0.015) (0.021) (0.027) (0.041)
1st-2nd year Open Lic. 0.001 -0.002 0.029** 0.012
(0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.028)
3rd+ year Open Lic. -0.053*** 0.042*** -0.016 0.082***
(0.015) (0.009) (0.019) (0.013)
Spillover Lic. yes yes
Spillover Closing. yes yes
Brothel ban lift yes yes
N (city x year) 176 176
N (individuals) 83,494 83,494
R2 0.095 0.13
Postcode fixed effects yes yes
Year dummies yes yes
Covariates yes yes
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; Based on data over the period
1993-2006 for violent crime and over 1997-2006 for drug crime. Fixed effects at postcode level. 22 cities
excludes Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague. Covariates are indicators for political party of mayor,
log(population male 15-65), log(pop. density), income (percent), immigrants (percent), unemployment
insurance recipients (percent), higher educated (percent), gender, age, education, Dutch nationality.
which imposed licensing immediately.33 Initially, the tippelzones were met with
opposition.34 Later, as city residents became more informed about the purpose of
a tippelzone they also became more accepting of it’s presence. Furthermore, our
empirical results indicate that the tippelzones achieved one of their stated goals
which was to reduce the nuisance created by drug-addicted prostitutes overall in
the city. However, the results also indicate that this relocation of street prostitutes
33Oostven (2008) reports for Nijmegen that residents in the adjacent area to the Tippelzone mention
drugs, drug addicts and dealers as the main reason for feeling unsafe. About 35 percent of these residents
report feeling unsafe, compared to 22 percent of the individuals living in the rest of the city.
34Van Soomeren (2004) states that in Amsterdam “the day after the opening, more than a hundred
residents from neighborhoods south of the zone took to the streets in protest, but the tippelzone remained
open.” (p. 6).
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and their following came at the expense of those living near the tippelzones who
became increasingly exposed to the drug dealers and drug-addicted clients.
Results for time-varying effects on perceived violence do not show any effect
of opening a tippelzone or licensing (presented in Table 16 in the appendix). As
such, they are in line with the results on registered crime in Table 5 for aggregate
illegal weapons and assaults.
VI. Conclusion
In this paper we study the effects of opening a legal street prostitution zone on
citywide crime. Theories of crime predict that the effect of opening such a tippel-
zone depends on the imposed regulation. Becker’s rational choice theory suggests
that opening a tippelzone with higher police monitoring reduces sexual violence
against prostitutes. Theories from criminology add that opening a tippelzone can
reduce sexual violence on a wider population by attracting sexually violent poten-
tial criminals. Theoretical models also predict that regulation through licensing
should reduce involuntary prostitution, but the predicted effect on total crime is
ambiguous.
Our empirical results for aggregate registered sexual abuse and rape are in
line with theoretical predictions. We find that the opening of a tippelzone in
a city is associated with a 30 − 40 percent decrease in sexual abuse and rape
in the first two years of opening. These effects do not depend on whether the
tippelzone immediately enforced a licensing system or not. Our data do not allow
us to distinguish between victims. In terms of policy it is highly relevant to
know whether the reduction in sexual violence is attributable to the relocated
street prostitutes or to a wider set of victims. We also find some evidence that
introducing a licensing system some years after opening, effectively forcing a large
share of illegal prostitutes to work outside the tippelzone, leads to a positive
increase in citywide sexual abuse.
In addition to effects on sexual violence, theoretical models predict that licens-
ing can produce different spillover effects of tippelzones on other crimes linked to
the prostitution market. Our results on registered drug crime show that open-
ing a tippelzone is associated with a 25 percent decrease in average citywide drug
crime and this result persists over time but only in cities which enforced a licensed
tippelzone from the start. However, we do not find any evidence for effects on
other crimes linked to trafficking organizations such as illegal weapons or violent
assaults.
The tippelzone experiment for cities like Amsterdam clearly indicates that the
zoning and legalizing of prostitutes when left unchecked can attract a set of ex-
isting criminals and also create a new market for illegally trafficked prostitutes.
However, Oostven (2008) indicates that the combination of licensing and rotating
agents was sufficient to maintain order in and around the tippelzones. Assuming
that the costs of the additional routine police surveillance are sufficiently low,
tippelzones can be a cost effective policy measure to reduce crime surrounding
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prostitutes. In addition, tippelzones reduce search costs of police officers for cer-
tain noise complaints and crimes which can also free up time for police to patrol
other areas of the city.
The public debate about tippelzones also focused on health concerns. Given the
proclivity of prostitutes for risky activity, policy makers may also be interested
in observing whether a tippelzone influences STDs, hospital admissions or deaths
due to overdose. Despite our efforts we were unable to find detailed enough data
on health questions.
Next, we consider the effect of tippelzones on perceived crime. Our results
indicate that residents in a city which opened a tippelzone without a licensing
system perceive a significant increase of 5− 6 percentage-points in drug nuisance
in the first two years after opening. The results in the medium to long-run are
less precise and differ depending on the residents’ proximity to the tippelzone and
whether or not a licensing system was enforced from the start. In general, the
results on registered and perceived drug crime in cities which enforced licensed
tippelzones suggest that local governments successfully achieved their goal of
reducing drug crime overall in the city.
It is regularly observed that registered and perceived crime do not match. For
example, Warr (2000) suggests that the public is likely to exaggerate the fre-
quency of rare serious crimes and underestimate the frequency of more common,
less serious ones. This can be explained by people fixating on available heuristics
presented in the media since the media aim for sensationalism rather than pro-
ducing an unbiased picture of actual crime (Lowry, Nio and Leitner 2003; Weitzer
and Kubrin 2004). In the Netherlands, crime is a relatively rare event and the
opening of tippelzones drew a lot of media attention affecting the public opinion.
Our preferred interpretation of the results is that the media coverage influenced
the perception of drug crime in the entire city. However, over time this increased
perception faded away except in the area surrounding the tippelzone. For the
people in these areas drug crime was simply more visible than before the opening
of the tippelzone.
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Appendix
Table 10—Overview of prostitution laws in selected countries
Country Legal Status
Prostitution Brothel Ownership Pimping
Netherlands
legal
legal
legal
Germany
Belgium
illegal
Canada
buying sex illegal
Sweden
illegal
USA illegal (except Nevada)
Japan
limited legality
Spain
UK
legalFrance
Italy
Note: Most countries enforce additional limitations and requirements for soliciting, procuring and sex
establishments. Source: http://prostitution.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourceID=000772
Table 11—Type of licensed sex establishments in the Netherlands
Type of establishment Approximate total in the Netherlands
Window prostitution 580
Sex club 260
Private home 130
Escort service 90
Erotic massage salon 60
Sex cinema 60
Swingers club 20
Other 70
Note: Approximations from Flight et al. (2006) based on survey responses from medium and large sized
municipalities across the Netherlands.
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Table 15—Time varying effects and robustness checks on citywide crime categories (22 cities)
Dependent variable: SexA. & Rape SexA. Rape Drugs Weapons Assault
1st-2nd year Open noLic. -0.369*** -0.438** -0.325** 0.107 0.230 0.029
(0.127) (0.199) (0.164) (0.345) (0.180) (0.129)
3rd+ year Open noLic. -0.064 -0.269 0.029 0.078 0.036 -0.031
(0.115) (0.225) (0.115) (0.364) (0.262) (0.146)
Intro. Lic. 0.186 0.306 0.144 -0.462 -0.066 0.129
(0.184) (0.198) (0.312) (0.403) (0.152) (0.148)
1st-2nd year Open Lic. -0.543*** -0.944*** -0.238 -0.359* -0.355* -0.062
(0.188) (0.326) (0.245) (0.199) (0.205) (0.113)
3rd+ year Open Lic. -0.051 -0.295* 0.123 -0.246** -0.239 0.114
(0.060) (0.159) (0.132) (0.112) (0.376) (0.132)
Spillover Lic. 0.038 0.104 0.029 -0.007 -0.057 0.016
(0.093) (0.152) (0.186) (0.058) (0.095) (0.023)
Spillover Closing -0.109 -0.294 -0.039 -0.018 0.009 0.015
(0.258) (0.362) (0.205) (0.109) (0.057) (0.032)
Brothel ban lift -0.072 -0.050 -0.082 -0.175 0.104 0.153
(0.201) (0.191) (0.299) (0.179) (0.152) (0.122)
Spill. Opening noLic. -0.016 -0.065 -0.007 0.043 -0.077 0.074
(0.095) (0.163) (0.068) (0.272) (0.162) (0.111)
Spill. Opening Lic. -0.057 -0.043 -0.060 0.163 -0.083 -0.097
(0.106) (0.120) (0.093) (0.168) (0.108) (0.093)
Spill. Intro. Lic. 0.106 0.145 0.109 0.220*** -0.094 0.068
(0.064) (0.142) (0.086) (0.083) (0.115) (0.061)
N (city x year) 395 395 395 395 395 395
R2 0.63 0.44 0.55 0.82 0.76 0.89
City fixed effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Covariates yes yes yes yes yes yes
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05 , *** p < 0.01. Significance (and standard errors in parenthesis) based on
Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008) wild bootstrap approach with 499 replications; Based on yearly data
over the period 1994-2011. The 22 cities exclude the large cities Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague
(and Eindhoven in 2011). Covariates are indicators for political party of mayor, log(population male
15-65), log(pop. density), income (percent), immigrants (percent), unemployment insurance recipients
(percent), higher educated (percent).
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Table 16—Within city effects of tippelzone on perceived crime (22 cities with covariates)
Drugs: Often Drugs: Often/Some.
Non-Tipp. Tipp. Non-Tipp. Tipp.
area area area area
pre-opening 0.008 0.012 0.032* 0.057**
(0.013) (0.027) (0.017) (0.022)
1st-2nd year Open noLic. 0.058*** 0.000 0.064*** 0.051
(0.022) (0.034) (0.023) (0.032)
3rd+ year Open noLic. 0.047* 0.032 0.079** 0.082*
(0.027) (0.040) (0.032) (0.049)
Introduce Lic. 0.015 0.011 0.025 -0.022
(0.015) (0.021) (0.027) (0.041)
1st-2nd year Open Lic. 0.001 -0.002 0.029** 0.012
(0.010) (0.015) (0.014) (0.028)
3rd+ year Open Lic. -0.053*** 0.042*** -0.016 0.082***
(0.015) (0.009) (0.019) (0.013)
Spillover Lic. -0.006 -0.015
(0.007) (0.010)
Spillover Closing. 0.003 0.007
(0.011) (0.014)
Brothel ban lift -0.023 -0.007
(0.017) (0.018)
N (city x year) 176 176
N (individuals) 83,494 83,494
R2 0.095 0.13
Violence: Often Violence: Often/Some.
Non-Tipp. Tipp. Non-Tipp. Tipp.
area area area area
pre-opening -0.009 0.000 -0.012 0.009
(0.007) (0.017) (0.012) (0.032)
1st-2nd year Open noLic. -0.001 -0.011 0.016 -0.004
(0.012) (0.019) (0.023) (0.031)
3rd+ year Open noLic. -0.017 -0.017 0.020 -0.001
(0.011) (0.019) (0.024) (0.037)
Introduce Lic. 0.002 0.016 0.044* 0.014
(0.010) (0.021) (0.025) (0.037)
1st-2nd year Open Lic. -0.006 0.002 0.001 0.022
(0.006) (0.009) (0.011) (0.024)
3rd+ year Open Lic. -0.004 -0.005 -0.005 -0.023
(0.009) (0.007) (0.013) (0.024)
Spillover Lic. 0.002 -0.007
(0.004) (0.010)
Spillover Closing. -0.004 -0.004
(0.005) (0.014)
Brothel ban lift -0.005 -0.016
(0.010) (0.020)
N (city x year) 220 220
N (individuals) 107,811 107,811
R2 0.026 0.078
Postcode fixed effects yes yes
Year dummies yes yes
Covariates yes yes
Note: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05. Clustered standard errors in parentheses; Based on data over the period
1993-2006 for violent crime and over 1997-2006 for drug crime. Fixed effects at postcode level. 22 cities
excludes Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague. Covariates are indicators for political party of mayor,
log(population male 15-65), log(pop. density), income (percent), immigrants (percent), unemployment
insurance recipients (percent), higher educated (percent), gender, age, education, Dutch nationality.
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Figure 5. Trends in Registered Crime Categories
Note: The no-tippelzone counterfactual for a city i is generated by estimating model (2) on twenty-one
cities leaving out city i and the three largest cities and then averaging the fitted values fixing d−it = 0,
lit = 0 and d
+
it = 0. Also note that in contrast to the panel estimations, the plotted trends of tippelzone
cities do not control for time varying covariates.
VOL. VOL NO. ISSUE BISSCHOP ET. AL.: STREET PROSTITUTION ZONES AND CRIME 41
avg. 3 Lic. intro.
UTR
NIJ
ARN
-
1.
5
-
1
-
.
5
0
.
5
1
1.
5
2
2.
5
 
D
iff
er
en
ce
 fr
om
 p
re
di
ct
ed
 c
on
tro
l g
ro
up
 m
ea
n 
(in
 lo
g)
-6 -4 -2 0 2 4
 Year
Figure 6. Licensing introduction
Note: The no-tippelzone or licensing counterfactual for a city i is generated by estimating model (2) on
twenty-one cities leaving out city i and the three largest cities and then averaging the fitted values fixing
d−it = 1, lit = 0 and d
+
it = 0.
